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One of the strong motivations for pursuing the development of fusion energy is its potentially low 
environmental impact and very good safety performance.  But this safety and environmental potential can only be 
fully realized by careful design choices.  For DEMO and other fusion facilities that will require nuclear licensing, 
S&E objectives and criteria should be set at an early stage and taken into account when choosing basic design 
options and throughout the design process. 
Studies in recent decades of the safety of fusion power plant concepts give a useful basis on which to build the 
S&E approach and to assess the impact of design choices. The experience of licensing ITER is of particular value, 
even though there are some important differences between ITER and DEMO.  The ITER project has developed a 
safety case, produced a preliminary safety report and had it examined by the French nuclear safety authorities, 
leading to the licence to construct the facility.  The key technical issues that arose during this process are recalled, 
particularly those that may also have an impact on DEMO safety. These include issues related to postulated 
accident scenarios, environmental releases during operation, occupational radiation exposure, and radioactive 
waste. 
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1. Introduction 
The ITER fusion device, currently under construction 
in the south of France, is the first nuclear fusion facility 
for which a full safety case has been prepared and 
subjected to the scrutiny of a nuclear regulator.  The case 
was presented in the ITER safety files, in particular the 
preliminary safety report (Rapport Préliminaire de 
Sûreté, RPrS) [1,2] and examined by the French nuclear 
safety authorities (Autorité de Sûreté Nucléaire, ASN) 
and their technical advisors (Institut de Radioprotection 
et de Sûreté Nucléaire, IRSN) [3,4].  The safety files 
were also submitted to a public enquiry and assessed by 
the French environmental agency.  The outcome of this 
stage of the licensing process was the granting by the 
French government, in November 2012, of the decree 
which authorizes the construction of the ITER nuclear 
facility. 
This process ensured that the ITER design achieves 
the high standard of nuclear safety expected by the 
authorities and by international nuclear safety guidelines.  
The documented safety analysis has shown that the 
operation of ITER will meet its goals for minimization 
of the likelihood and consequences of potential 
accidents, with extremely low environmental impact 
during normal operation including maintenance 
activities, and that generated radioactive waste is 
manageable and reduced to the maximum extent 
possible. In the course of this safety and licensing 
process many lessons have been learned.  Some of these 
are of direct relevance to DEMO or other future nuclear 
fusion facilities, and may inform considerations of 
design options from the very beginning of the conceptual 
design of these facilities. 
In this paper some of the key technical issues that 
have been addressed are outlined, particularly where the 
issue may also be of relevance to DEMO (note that the 
term “DEMO” is used generically in the text, and refers 
also to other possible fusion facilities that may be 
conceived to come between ITER and a commercial 
power plant, such as a Component Test Facility or a 
Fusion Nuclear Science Facility).   
2. Differences between ITER and DEMO 
Before considering those aspects of ITER safety that 
may have relevance to DEMO, it is useful to recall the 
essential differences between the two projects.  Some of 
these are listed in table 1.  They may imply that some 
aspects of the safety approach employed for ITER may 
not be transferable to DEMO.  However, many of the 
issues encountered in the safety and licensing of ITER 
are certainly of potential relevance to DEMO, including 
those described in the following sections. 
3. Safety objectives and safety functions 
The top-level safety objectives for ITER are based on 
international guidelines and are similar to those adopted 
by any nuclear facility, with the addition that the 
advantageous safety characteristics of fusion should lead 
to limited consequences of any accident. They are: 
• to protect workers, the public and the environment 
from harm; 
• to ensure in normal operation that exposure to 
hazards within the premises and due to release of 
hazardous material from the premises is controlled, 
kept below prescribed limits and minimized to be as 
low as reasonably achievable; 
 • to ensure that the likelihood of accidents is 
minimized and that their consequences are bounded; 
• to ensure that the consequences of more frequent 
incidents, if any, are minor; 
• to demonstrate that the favourable safety 
characteristics of fusion permit a safety approach that 
limits the hazards from accidents such that in any 
event there is no need for public evacuation on 
technical grounds; 
• to minimize radioactive waste hazards and volumes 
and ensure that they are as low as reasonably 
achievable. 
Similar objectives should be appropriate for DEMO, 
and are consistent with those adopted for earlier studies 
of the safety of fusion power plant, such as the European 
Power Plant Conceptual Study (PPCS) [5].  The goal of 
ensuring that public doses following an accident could 
never reach the level at which evacuation would be 
triggered has been a constant feature of such studies. The 
radioactive waste target has often been stated as ensuring 
that waste is not a burden on future generations, 
effectively requiring that all active material could be 
cleared or recycled within a period of up to 100 years. 
In pursuing the above objectives, just two safety 
functions are defined for ITER: 
• Confinement of radioactive material; 
• Limitation of exposure to ionizing radiation. 
These are also suitable safety functions for DEMO, 
with confinement preventing releases to the environment 
during normal operation and maintenance as well as in 
accident situations.  In ITER there are also several non-
safety supporting functions which enable the above two 
to be achieved in all situations.  They include fire 
protection and prevention of explosions, and decay heat 
removal (see sections 5.2 and 5.3). 
4. Confinement 
The strategy for confinement in ITER is that every 
significant inventory of radioactive material is protected 
by two confinement systems, each comprising one or 
more physical or functional barriers.  Broadly, the first 
confinement system prevents mobilization within the 
facility, and thereby protects workers, and the second 
confinement system prevents release to the environment 
in the event that the first confinement has failed. A 
similar strategy would be appropriate for DEMO and 
other fusion nuclear facilities, but care must be taken 
with the choice of the physical barriers that are to 
provide the confinement function. 
In ITER, for the in-vessel inventory of tritium and 
activated erosion dust (assumed to be up to 1 kg and 
1000 kg respectively) the first confinement system is the 
vacuum vessel (VV) and its extensions.  The vessel is a 
robust double-walled chamber designed to resist, with a 
large margin, all foreseen loads including 
electromagnetic loads induced by the largest expected 
plasma vertical displacement event.  But the VV 
“extensions” include not only the 45 ports but also 
hundreds of penetrations through the vacuum boundary 
Table 1.Essential ITER/DEMO differences 
 
ITER DEMO 
Experimental device with 
physics and technology 
missions 
Nearer to a commercial 
power plant, but with 
some development 
missions 
400s pulses (some longer 
at lower power), long 
dwell time 
Long pulse, quasi-steady 
state 
Experimental campaigns. 
Outages for maintenance 
and component 
replacements 
Maximize availability 
Large number of 
diagnostics 
Only those required for 
operation 
Multiple heating and 
current drive systems 
Fewer 
Large design margins, 
necessitated by 
uncertainties and lack of 
fully appropriate design 
codes 
With ITER (and other) 
experience, design could 
have smaller uncertainties 
Cooling system optimized 
for minimum stresses and 
sized for modest heat 
rejection 
Cooling system optimized 
for electricity generation 
efficiency (e.g. higher 
temperature) 
Test blanket modules 
introduce range of diverse 
concepts 
Single blanket concept 
Unique one-off design 
optimized for experimental 
goals within cost 
constraints 
Move towards design 
choices suitable for series 
production 
No tritium breeding 
requirement (except very 
small quantity in TBMs) 
Tritium breeding needed 
for self-sufficiency 
Conventional 316 stainless 
steel structure 
Novel low activation 
materials as structure (at 
least for some 
components) 
Very modest lifetime 
neutron fluence, low dpa 
and He production 
High fluence, significant 
materials damage 
Licensing as experimental 
facility allows some credit 
for experimental nature 
(e.g. no dependence of 
safety on plasma behavior) 
Stricter approach may be 
necessary to avoid large 
design margins 
During conceptual design 
(including “EDA”), 
licensing in any ITER 
member country had to be 
possible 
Fewer constraints 
 
 for cooling systems, heating and current drive systems, 
diagnostics systems, in-vessel coil feeders, etc.  All of 
these participate in providing the first confinement 
barrier and are therefore of highest safety importance 
class. 
The situation with VV penetration systems is 
complicated by the firm policy of not crediting any in-
vessel component with a safety function.  In ITER this is 
essential because the experimental nature of these 
components implies that they are prone to failure and 
their reliability in accidental situations could not be 
guaranteed.  In safety analyses it is generally assumed 
that there is a first wall or divertor failure in any relevant 
accident scenario.  This means that, for water cooling 
circuits, for example, the section inside the VV has to be 
assumed to be breached, meaning that the ex-vessel part, 
at least up until safety-class isolation valves, is part of 
the first confinement system and must be reliably leak-
free in all situations including earthquake. This results in 
a first confinement barrier that comprises many tens of 
km of pipework, ducts, waveguides etc. and hundreds of 
isolation valves and windows including non-metallic 
windows for which a qualification is needed. 
For electricity-producing fusion power plant of the 
future, in-vessel components must be highly reliable and 
damaging plasma disruptions must be eliminated.  At 
that stage it will be possible to credit these components 
with some safety function, if required.  DEMO and other 
mid-term nuclear fusion facilities are at some 
intermediate stage.  In-vessel components such as the 
divertor and first wall/blankets will still be at a 
developmental stage, but some of the parts inside the 
VV, such as sections of cooling circuit, could possibly 
be credited with a confinement function in order to avoid 
the extensive and complex ex-vessel parts that 
complicate the first confinement barrier in ITER. 
5. Accidents 
5.1 Accident analyses 
The chief concern for the consequences of abnormal 
events is the potential to damage, degrade or bypass the 
confinement systems.  Such an accident could lead to 
mobilization of radioactive material within the facility, 
and consequent exposure of personnel, and ultimately to 
the release to the environment of some part of the 
radioactive inventory and possible public radiation dose.  
In the ITER safety case, extensive analysis of postulated 
accident scenarios have been performed [6], and have 
shown that the worst consequences in terms of public 
doses are minor. 
Accident analyses have similarly been performed in 
the past as part of studies of fusion power plant concepts 
[7] and have reached similar conclusions for the range of 
event scenarios studied.  For DEMO, it will be necessary 
to perform more detailed analyses as designs are 
developed and, as in the ITER approach, these will 
indicate what supporting safety functions are required 
and what systems need to be credited in order to 
maintain low consequences of any conceivable event. 
In ITER, a potential accident sequence arises from 
the possibility of a break in a cryoline or cryogenically-
cooled component and release into the building of large 
quantities of helium cryogen.  This could lead to over-
pressure and under-temperature stresses and a challenge 
to a confinement system.  The potential is particularly of 
concern if the leak is into a room containing a 
radioactive inventory. This hazard will exist in any 
facility with a large cryogenic and cryo-distribution 
system.  Analyses must be performed to ensure that the 
stresses can be accommodated and/or that adequate 
pressure-relief provisions are in place. 
As has been done for ITER, a full range of external 
events should be considered as accident initiators, 
including combinations of events.  Even for extremely 
improbable combinations of events, it is likely to be 
required to show that consequences are limited and that 
there is no “cliff-edge” effect. 
5.2 Fire and explosion 
Following the experience of ITER, particular 
attention should be afforded to the potential for fire and 
explosion events involving hydrogen.  Substantial 
inventories of hydrogen isotopes will be present in parts 
of the ITER plant, and it might be expected that in 
DEMO these could be even higher, owing to the higher 
throughput of deuterium and tritium fuels. 
In ITER, the hydrogen explosion risks fall into two 
types.  The first relates to the risk of a deflagration of 
hydrogen within building rooms housing systems of the 
fuel cycle, including vacuum pumping, fuel processing, 
fuel storage, and fuel injection systems.  A flammable or 
explosible hydrogen/air mixture could result from an 
accidental leak of hydrogen, deuterium or tritium from 
fuel cycle equipment.  A similar risk may exist 
elsewhere, for example in the hot cell where tritium is 
recovered from dust or components that have been 
removed from the VV.  A deflagration or detonation of 
such a mixture could challenge the integrity of building 
walls and slabs that are providing part of the second 
confinement system.  If the explosion involves tritium, 
then the radioactive source term for release through a 
damaged confinement is already available, i.e. the event 
involves the breach of both confinement systems.  This 
event can be avoided or mitigated by a combination of 
measures:  
• fire detection and suppression systems,  
• air mixing systems to prevent local hydrogen 
concentrations above the flammable limit,  
• establishment of a fire sectorization with limited 
tritium inventory in each sector (where possible), to 
restrict the amount releasable in a single fire, 
• design building walls and slabs to resist the 
maximum overpressure foreseen in postulated 
explosion events – this requires extensive analysis. 
Similar provisions to these must be taken in DEMO, 
where the risks will be similar.  In particular attention 
must be paid to the fire sectoring and overpressure 
requirements at an early stage of building layout design. 
 The ignition energy for hydrogen/air is very low, so 
avoiding ignition sources is not practicable. 
The second area of concern for hydrogen explosions 
is in-vessel.  Here there is a significant inventory of 
deuterium and tritium trapped in plasma-facing 
components and absorbed in dust, as well as stored on 
cryopump panels awaiting regeneration.  This inventory 
could be augmented in certain accident scenarios, see 
below.  It is credible to postulate an accident that 
involves an ingress of air into the VV, a “Loss of 
vacuum accident” (LOVA), leading to mobilization of a 
part of this inventory and the formation of a hydrogen/air 
mixture above the flammable limit.  The small energy 
required to ignite the mixture is readily available from 
hot surfaces. 
In ITER, an additional hydrogen inventory may be 
generated in the case of an ingress of coolant into the 
vessel following damage of a first wall or divertor.  A 
chemical reaction can be foreseen between steam and 
beryllium, either on the first wall or as dust, which may 
have high porosity.  This reaction produces hydrogen 
and is exothermic.  In another facility such as DEMO, 
which is expected to use tungsten in place of beryllium 
as plasma-facing material,  this source of hydrogen could 
be greatly reduced.  If a coolant other than water is used, 
it could be eliminated.  
It is not clear if the timescales for the mobilization 
and generation of hydrogen isotopes from these various 
sources are similar, and therefore whether they should be 
considered in combination for an explosion scenario.  
But if a hydrogen explosion does occur, it has the 
potential to create a transient overpressure that exceeds 
the design pressure of the vessel and other parts of the 
vacuum boundary (0.2 MPa abs. in ITER). Furthermore 
it can be postulated that even a relatively small hydrogen 
explosion could mobilize collected beryllium dust and 
ignite it in a dust cloud explosion that could also create 
an overpressure challenging the confinement barrier.  
Again, for DEMO, it may be possible to reduce this 
potential aggravation by choosing a plasma-facing 
material other than beryllium. 
If the possibility of hydrogen and dust explosions 
cannot be eliminated by choice of materials, it may be 
feasible to minimize the associated risk by active design 
measures.  For ITER, consideration is being given to 
installing a mitigation solution based either on igniters 
within the vessel, which could ignite a hydrogen/air 
mixture as soon as the lower flammability limit is 
reached and resulting in a harmless low-pressure 
combustion, or a rapid injection into the vessel of an 
inert gas, triggered by the detection of air ingress into the 
vessel (a LOVA) [8]. The igniters solution could be hot-
wire filaments with battery-backed power supply, 
constantly hot while the vessel is under vacuum and thus 
highly reliable.  The locations for these igniters must be 
chosen with the aid of CFD modeling to maximize their 
effectiveness.  For the gas injection solution, the location 
of the injection points must be chosen with care to avoid 
the dynamic effect of the gas injection causing a local 
concentration of hydrogen.   
A further option for DEMO, not considered for 
ITER, would be the filling of volumes surrounding the 
VV with an inert gas, to avoid any possibility of air 
ingress.  This would have to include any rooms or cells 
where there are penetration lines that extend the vacuum 
boundary, and for this reason may not be practical.   
5.3 Decay heat removal 
For ITER the removal of decay heat after plasma 
shutdown is regarded as a supporting function, not a 
primary safety function.  Failure to remove decay heat 
does not in itself lead to any safety consequence, as 
temperatures rise only very slowly and do not reach the 
level at which any structural degradation could be 
expected.  For a fusion plant operating at substantially 
higher power than ITER’s 500 MW and close to steady-
state or high duty cycle pulses, the removal of decay heat 
could be classed as an additional safety function. 
The level of decay heat in ITER is low, starting at a 
plant total of around 10 MW at shutdown and falling 
below 1 MW within one day, corresponding to an 
average heat density in all in-vessel components of less 
than 1 W/kg.  For DEMO, the low activation materials 
that may be used for plasma-facing components produce 
lower decay heat than the 316 stainless steel in ITER, 
but this is compensated for by higher plasma power and 
much higher duty cycle.  In conceptual power plant 
studies [5], the total decay heat densities in in-vessel 
components based on Eurofer low-activation 
martensitic-ferritic steel are typically around 10 W/kg 
after 1 day, and a DEMO using this structural material 
could be expected to be similar.  This order of magnitude 
increase compared with ITER may be enough to make 
decay heat a potential hazard in its own right, and its 
removal a safety function. 
The removal of decay heat in ITER is done via the 
VV coolant loop, which, even with a slow rate of 
circulation, can reject the heat not only of the vessel 
itself but also of all in-vessel components as their heat is 
conducted and radiated out to the vessel walls.  This low 
coolant flow can be maintained by a small pump 
powered by the emergency diesel generators in the event 
of a loss of power.  If this too fails, studies have shown 
that the introduction of a fluid, such as air, into the 
cryostat volume is sufficient to allow a passive removal 
of the heat by convection and conduction to the cold 
magnet structures and to the cryostat wall and the 
atmosphere outside [2].  A similar approach may be 
suitable for DEMO, and a passive means of ultimate heat 
removal is to be favoured. 
5.4 Control of tritium inventories 
As noted in section 5.2, maintaining a restriction on 
the quantity of tritium that may be vulnerable to release 
in an accident scenario such as a fire is a key provision 
to limit the severity of the consequences.  This implies a 
strict control on the inventory of tritium in each process 
and storage system, as well as within each room (or fire 
sector), including that of trapped tritium such as inside 
the VV.  Tritium accountancy in a complex system can 
 be challenging; at ITER it will be based on maintaining a 
number of mass balance areas [9].   
For DEMO the implementation of a tritium 
accountancy system is further complicated by the 
additional tritium produced in the breeding blankets and 
returned to the fuel cycle by an extraction system.  The 
increased throughput of tritium via fuelling and pumping 
systems may also increase uncertainties. 
6. Environmental releases in normal operation 
The potential for routine releases of radioactive 
material in gaseous or liquid form has been assessed in 
earlier studies of fusion power plant concepts [5], with 
the conclusion that emissions would be very low, with a 
maximum public dose impact around 1 μSv/year.  This 
may now appear to be an under-estimate. For ITER a 
more extensive study was carried out, identifying a 
wider range of potential contributions to releases.  For 
gaseous and aerosol releases, it was recognized that 
these may come from a number of sources: 
• tritium leaks from fuel cycle equipment during 
normal operation and maintenance; 
• outgassing of tritium from components removed 
from the vessel during their storage or processing in 
the hot cell including storage while waiting for 
disposal; 
• leaks from the tritium recovery station used to 
remove tritium from dust that has been collected in 
the vessel or from solid components before disposal; 
• outgassing of tritium and suspended dust particles via 
the vessel vent system during periods that the VV is 
vented for maintenance. 
The earlier power plant studies only considered in 
detail the first of these sources.  For DEMO it will be 
essential to analyze them all and to implement strategies 
to minimize environmental releases.  As at ITER, this 
can be achieved by filtered venting and detritiation 
systems that maintain a sub-atmospheric pressure in the 
volumes into which the leaks may occur.  There may be 
very small additional tritium releases via permeation into 
rooms not served by detritiation systems, or into cooling 
water circuits and released at the cooling towers; this 
should be assessed.  Detritiation systems must be highly 
reliable and maintain a specified efficiency in all normal 
and abnormal situations.  Additional measures at ITER 
to reduce tritium releases include the baking of the 
divertor at 350°C before any venting and opening of the 
vessel ports.  This is the region in which dust is expected 
to accumulate, and the baking promotes outgassing of 
absorbed tritium which can then be returned to the fuel 
cycle via the normal pumping system. 
In a water-cooled tokamak such as ITER, the 
potential for liquid releases to the environment arises 
principally from leaks from the primary cooling circuit.  
This can be expected to contain an inventory of activated 
corrosion products as well as tritium through permeation.  
Other sources of contaminated water may arise from 
processes that employ water, from water used in 
cleaning and decontamination procedures, from 
condensation in contaminated atmospheres such as the 
hot cell, and from test samples in laboratories.  
Secondary water coolant loops may also become low-
level contaminated, even with a gaseous primary, 
particularly by tritium permeation in  the heat exchanger 
or by small heat exchanger tube leaks. 
The outcome of this is that the plant may contain 
water with a wide range of contamination levels.  At 
ITER, water with relatively high tritium content can be 
sent to the Water Detritiation System within the tritium 
plant, where the tritium is recovered.  Water with a very 
low level of tritium content can be discharged, after 
monitoring, as industrial waste.  But there is a range of 
tritium content in between these two levels at which 
there is no on-site destination.  For ITER, it is not 
expected to generate water contaminated in this range, 
but if it did occur it may have to be transported off site to 
another nuclear facility that could treat it.  For DEMO, it 
is important to ensure that the full range of anticipated 
contamination levels is identified and treatment or 
disposal paths implemented for all parts of it. 
The estimation of public doses as a consequence of 
environmental release of tritium depends on a prediction 
of the dispersion of HT and HTO, the biological hazard 
potential if the tritium is inhaled or ingested, and in the 
latter case the pathways for tritium to reach the food 
chain.  This includes the formation of organically bound 
tritium in vegetable matter.  These processes are well 
represented in dispersion and dose modeling [10], but 
there may be scope for further improvement. 
7. Solid radioactive waste 
Safety and environmental studies of conceptual 
fusion power plant [5] have shown that by the use of low 
activation materials for components close to the plasma 
it is possible to restrict activation to the level that most – 
perhaps all – of the activated material will decay within a 
century to the level at which it could be cleared (i.e. 
recycled with no restriction on its use) or recycled within 
the nuclear industry.  The criteria for permitting 
clearance or recycling vary from country to country [11] 
and in some studies the limits for the recyclability of 
material have been set in terms of radiological criteria 
somewhat arbitrarily.  It will be essential to develop 
viable industrial processes for recycling procedures, and 
at the same time establish realistic criteria. Nevertheless 
the studies give confidence that it will be possible to 
avoid an accumulation of radioactive waste that could be 
a burden on future generations. 
ITER is being fabricated of austeninic stainless steel, 
with a few specific impurities controlled to minimize 
long-term activation.  This steel will reach a higher level 
of activation, per incident neutron, than the low 
activation materials under development for a power 
plant.  However the integrated lifetime neutron fluence 
in ITER, 0.3 MW.yr/m2, is very much lower than that 
expected of a typical power plant, which could be up to 
50 MW.yr/m2 over a 20-year plant life. The combination 
of these competing effects is that the level of activation 
of material in a power plant, and hence its classification, 
could be similar to that of ITER.  DEMO is likely to be 
 in an intermediate position, with fluence somewhat less 
than a power plant, but maybe with less than full 
deployment of low activation materials.  Thus again, the 
level of activation of waste could be similar to ITER, 
and the quantity too for concepts that are of a similar 
major radius to that of ITER. 
An issue that arose during the development of the 
waste management strategy for ITER is that material that 
is both activated and contaminated with tritium does not 
at present have a disposal path within the French 
radioactive waste repositories.  To resolve this an interim 
waste store is planned to allow for several half-lives 
decay of tritium before its final disposal [12].  This issue 
is likely to be also applicable to DEMO and other future 
facilities, unless an effective detritiation technique for 
solid radioactive waste is developed and implemented. 
8. Occupational Radiation Exposure 
In a nuclear fusion facility such as ITER or DEMO 
the requirement to keep personnel doses As Low As 
Reasonably Achievable is achieved by a rather 
conventional approach: 
• Maximize the use of remote handling to avoid human 
intervention in active areas; 
• Minimize shutdown gamma dose rates by design of 
components and choice of low-activation materials; 
• Optimize maintenance procedures to reduce the 
duration of human access to areas of high dose rate; 
• Provide adequate shielding to keep dose rates low; 
• Implement an access control system to impose a 
radiological zoning scheme. 
At ITER an optimization is applied to the design to 
reduce the potential for occupational doses to the 
maximum extent realistically possible [13]. 
Access to the tokamak during plasma operation is 
prohibited including all rooms containing parts of the 
primary water cooling circuit, due to intense high-energy 
gamma radiation from the decay of 16N.  This nuclide is 
generated in water by the reaction 16O (n,p) 16N and is 
therefore unavoidable.  As this reaction has a neutron 
energy threshold of 10.5 MeV, it is far more important in 
D-T fusion devices compared with other nuclear 
facilities such as fission reactors.  Although 16N has a 
half-life of only 7.1 s, it is sufficient to make all parts of 
a water cooling circuit a prominent source of radiation 
during operation, including those parts lying outside the 
bioshield.  Of course, for DEMO this problem could be 
excluded by choosing a coolant other than water. 
9. Conclusions 
The experience of the ITER project in developing a 
safety approach, implementing it in a safety design, and 
performing safety analyses under the scrutiny of a 
nuclear regulator is of relevance to DEMO and other 
future nuclear fusion facilities.  Although there are some 
important differences between ITER and DEMO, many 
of the issues encountered during the development of the 
ITER safety case and its defence before the French 
nuclear safety authorities are of potential importance to 
DEMO.  Some of these may be eliminated or 
ameliorated by fundamental design choices, and so 
should be taken into account from the very beginning of 
DEMO design activities.  
Finally it should be noted that the scope of this paper 
has been limited to radiological hazards.  Non-nuclear 
hazards and potential environmental impacts, for 
example associated with the use of beryllium, must also 
be addressed. 
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